This appendix outlines a more general version of the model in the main body of the paper. We augment the model to allow for tax evasion and distortionary taxes. This appendix is organized as follows. Section 1.1 outlines the general model and section 1.2 solves for its equilibrium. Sections 1.3 and 1.4 describe steady states …rst for a social planner and then when policy is politically-motivated. The latter gives conditions for the existence of three types of steady state: common interest, redistributive, and weak. The conditions parallel the cohesiveness and stability conditions in the body of the paper, and we show that the conditions in the benchmark model are special cases of the ones presented here. In section 1.5 we discuss how the demand for public goods a¤ects the stability and cohesiveness conditions and the possibility of multiple equilibria in this model. Section 1.6 proves the claims made elsewhere in this appendix.
The model 1.Households
The model is identical to the benchmark model in all dimensions not discussed here. Household income is no longer exogenous. Instead, in each period s; households choose the hours of work they supply h s and have access to a technology that transforms a unit of labour into ! units of consumption. As in the benchmark model, they face a tax rate t s ; but can now evade taxation at a cost s per unit of income concealed from tax collectors. s is denominated in units of consumption goods. e s denotes household income that is sheltered from taxation. Households have quasilinear preferences with respect to consumption and a convex utility cost with respect to hours worked. Household preferences can be summarized as follows: (1 t s ) !h s + t s e s e s s h
The choice of tax evasion is then simply e s = (t s ; s ) 0 t s s !h s t s > s :
Households conceal their entire income if the cost of evasion is lower than the tax rate, and pay their tax liabilities in full otherwise. We assume that households comply when they are indi¤erent between evasion and payment. Fiscal capacity s increase tax e¢ ciency because higher …scal capacity increases the range of values t s for which tax e¢ ciency is strictly positive. A more general formulation, where tax e¢ ciency is monotonically increasing in s is possible. In such a formulation, the cost of tax evasion could take a more general form, for example C (e s ; s ) ; giving a di¤erentiable function (t s ; s ) ; which in turn would lead to a tax e¢ ciency function that is increasing in s for all t s . The more general formulation would complicate analysis signi…cantly with no obvious gains in insight.
Choice of policy
In each period s, the incumbent collects tax revenues ofR (t s ; s ) and uses these resources to (a) provide public goods g s , (b) accumulate …scal (tax enforcement) capacity at cost c ( s+1 (1 d) s ) and (c) make transfers r ; where J 2 fI; Og, I = 2 (1 ) and J = 2 . The incumbent's choice of t s is static and can be described as follows. For any choice t s > s , (t s ; s ) = !h s andR (t s ; s ) = 0: Taxes do not raise revenues and no such choice can be optimal for the incumbent. The problem can be reframed by setting (t s ; s ) = 0 and with the additional constraint t s s . Indirect utility can then be reformulated as
; where
The incumbent's maximization problem is then
with U I ( ) the incumbent's value function, Z I ( ) (1 ) U I ( ) + U O ( ) his continuation value, time subscripts suppressed, and 0 denoting s+1 . The static …rst order condition
is now combined with
where is the Lagrange multiplier on (3) and
is the marginal cost of public funds. > 0 only if t = ; i.e. if tax capacity constrains the incumbent's choice of the tax rate.
The …rst of these …rst order conditions states that the marginal value of the public good must equal its marginal cost. The second of these equations states that the marginal value of the public good equals the marginal cost of public funds, unless taxation is limited by institutional rather than economic constraints.
Finally we have
which degenerates to
if Z (:) is di¤erentiable at the chosen value of 0 .
Equilibrium
Our equilibrium concept is as in the benchmark model: A Symmetric Markov Perfect Equilibrium (MPE). Here too, we restrict attention to equilibria that are limits to a …nite horizon economy.
Characterizing the equilibrium
There exists a level of …scal capacity~ ; above which redistribution occurs. Thus~ partitions the state space into a common-interest regime, where all tax revenues are allocated to public goods including …scal capacity, and a redistributive regime, where redistribution occurs and g =ĝ, de…ned implicitly by
There are now two cases, depending on whether economic constraints (tax distortions) or institutional constraints (…scal capacity) limit taxation. If …scal capacity is su¢ ciently high so that the tax rate can be chosen freely, t s is chosen jointly with public spending so as to equalize the marginal cost of taxation with the marginal value of public goods. This is done according to (4) with = 0.
In the common-interest regime, policy is set to ft ( ) ; g ( ) ; T ( )g ; which jointly solve V g (g ( )) = (t ( )) ;
(6) and (3) holding with equality. g ( ) and T ( ) are increasing in , while t ( ) is decreasing in : In the redistributive regime; g =ĝ; and (4) gives t =t ; de…ned implicitly by t = 2 (1 ) :
This can be solved to give a closed form solution fort:
t gives the highest tax rate that a redistributing incumbent would be willing to bear to …nance redistribution, due to the ensuing tax distortions.t is decreasing in ; as the value of redistribution is lower in a more cohesive society, justifying lower taxes to …nance such redistribution.t is also decreasing in " as taxes are less distortionary the lower is the elasticity of labour supply. As t ( )is strictly decreasing in , there is thus a threshold value , below which < t ( ) and …scal capacity constrains taxation and above which > t ( ) and tax distortions constrain taxation.
We can summarize the equilibrium as follows. If > ; taxes are set at ft ( ) ; g ( ) ; T ( )g : If < then t = and fg; 0 g solve (6) and the budget constraint (3) holding with equality if g <ĝ or g =ĝ otherwise.
In the benchmark model, the state space was partitioned by a value~ ; above which the economy operated in the redistributive regime, and under which it operated in the common-interest regime. In this appendix, the state space is additionally partitioned by the value ; above which taxation is constrained by tax distortions, and below which it is constrained by …scal capacity.
Pigouvian Planner
Consider …rst the problem of a Pigouvian planner who is in power inde…nitely and puts equal weights on the welfare of all citizens. This corresponds to the case = 1 2 and = 0: In this case Z I ( ) = U I ( ) and the problem becomes a standard dynamic programming problem, where U I ( ) is a concave function and
where is de…ned in the previous section. Noting that
and we can rewrite the marginal value of …scal capacity as
As ( ) = V g (g) 8 > ; U I ( ) is continuous at = :
and for a choice 0 > (9) then gives
As (1 d) < 1; this implies a declining path of …scal capacity and there can be no steady state with > : If there is "excess" …scal capacity, in the sense that tax distortions rather than …scal capacity are the binding constraint on taxation, the incumbent will decummulate …scal capacity until institutional-rather than economic-constraints limit taxation. Now consider a choice 0 < : We obtain the Euler equation
This system has a unique steady state at
Recalling (4), P < because
and therefore > 0 at the steady state P . This points to a qualitative contrast between our model and that of Battaglilni and Coate (2007, 2008) . In Battaglini and Coate (2007, 2008) the marginal value of the public good is always equal to the marginal cost of public funds and economic constraints limit taxation. Here, the marginal value of the public good exceeds the marginal cost of public funds (t) in steady state.
In a Pigouvian steady state, the marginal bene…t of public good provision is set equal to the marginal cost of maintaining the steady state level of …scal capacity. This cost comprises both the distortionary cost of taxation and the cost of …scal capacity maintenance. Thus the marginal value of public goods strictly exceeds the marginal cost of public funds, and the distortionary cost of taxation is not the binding constraint on the chosen level of taxation.
Political Economy
We now outline the conditions for steady states in the three possible regions: common interest, redistributive, and a "weak"state at the boundary between the common interest and redistributive regimes. As in the benchmark model, two critical conditions determine the existence of each type of steady state. Due to the additional complication of distortionary taxation, however, we are unable to obtain closed-form solutions for these conditions.
The cohesiveness condition determines the existence of a common-interest steady state. As in the benchmark model, a common-interest steady state is attainable only if the Pigouvian steady state analyzed in the previous section is within the common-interest regime. This yields the following condition:
The Cohesiveness Condition:
The de…nition of P in (10) is not a function of the political-economy parameters and : Thus the cohesiveness condition is a condition on alone (viaĝ) and holds for values of that are su¢ ciently close to 1 2 . The second condition is the stability condition. When the stability condition holds, a redistributive steady state exists.
where R = min t ;^ and^ is de…ned implicitly via
As in the benchmark model, the stability condition is a function of and :
(1 ) (1 ) + is an important stability parameter. It determines the expected share of next period's transfers obtained by the incumbent. Aŝ is increasing in in (11), the stability condition is more likely to hold the larger is ; as in the benchmark model.
We now explore the relationship between the cohesiveness and stability conditions in the benchmark model and the ones presented here. An inelastic labour supply is equivalent to " ! 0. As " ! 0; ( ) ! 1 and H (t) ! !: Then (10) gives
and the cohesiveness condition becomes
which is precisely the cohesiveness condition in the body of the paper. When labour supply is inelastic, (11) is no longer a function of ; as its left hand side remains 2 (1 ) c; but its right hand side becomes 2 (! + c (1 d)) !: These are precisely the marginal cost and marginal bene…t, respectively, of remaining in a redistributive steady state inde…nitely in the benchmark model. If the cost exceeds the bene…t then no redistributive steady state exists, as an incumbent in the redistributive regime would choose to move to the common interest regime in the following period. If the bene…t strictly exceeds the cost-as is the case when the stability condition holds in the benchmark model-an incumbent in the redistributive regime wishes to accumulate …scal capacity with no bound, and a redistributive steady state exists at R = : Put di¤erently, in the benchmark model, R is always at a corner solution. If the benchmark stability condition holds, R = , and if it fails to hold R = 0: In the benchmark model, was assumed to be such that
; so that that our new stability condition holds whenever the stability condition in the benchmark model holds. If the benchmark stability condition does not hold then R = 0 and the stability condition here cannot either.
A qualitative di¤erence between this model and the benchmark model emerges due to the di¤erence between the stability conditions of these two models. The candidate redistributive steady state in the benchmark model is the corner-solution ; which is always in the redistributive regime. Here, due to the convexity created by distortionary taxation, an interior candidate for a redistributive steady state R emerges. An additional condition must be satis…ed for a redistributive steady state to exist. The value of R must be in the redistributive regime, which corresponds to the stability condition listed above.
Unlike the benchmark model, the cohesiveness and stability conditions are not mutually exclusive. In the benchmark model, the candidate redistributive steady state is zero whenever the cohesiveness condition holds. Thus R < P whenever the cohesiveness condition holds, and the overlap between the cohesiveness and stability conditions is degenerate. Here, however, R is endogenous and interior. Its value may thus exceed or be lower than P ; allowing for the stability condition, the cohesiveness condition, both, or neither, to hold.
We also note that the marginal value of the public good ; which is central to equilibrium determination in Battaglini and Coate (2007) reemerges as a key parameter in our model with distortionary taxation. High values of increaseĝ; which now appears in both the stability and the cohesiveness conditions. Higher levels of make it more likely for the cohesiveness condition to hold and less likely that stability condition holds.
Discussion
In the following section we formally prove the main claim of this appendix. Modi…ed cohesiveness and stability conditions partition the state space into regions, each corresponding to one of the three steady states in the benchmark model. In this section, we show that the model with distortionary taxation yields very similar results to those in the benchmark model.
We cannot obtain analytical solutions for the cohesiveness and stability conditions when taxes are distortionary. We resort to computational methods. 2 The following …gures show the values of and required for the existence of each type of steady state. We plot these …gures for di¤erent values of ; which is now an important parameter in determining the type of steady state that emerges. 2 For the sake of comparison, we use the same parameter values as were used to plot Figure 7 in the benchmark model. These parameters were chosen for graphical convenience rather than an attempt to "calibrate" to empirical values: c = 2, ! = 0:9, d = 0:17 and = 0:95. Two additional parameters are introduced in the general model. We set " = 2, an elasticity commonly used in the literature, and vary to demonstrate its e¤ects. The …rst of these …gures is plotted for a value of that gives an almost identical picture to that in benchmark model. This demonstrates that the result in the benchmark model is largely robust to the introduction of distortionary taxation.
The second …gure shows the e¤ects of an increase in : A higher level of increases the range where the common interest state exists and decreases the range where the redistributive state exists. The latter parameter values also allow for a region where both the stability and cohesiveness conditions hold. In the region of overlap, a redistributive steady state exists.
In contrast to Battaglini and Coate (2007) our equilibrium re…nement method ensures a unique equilibrium. A …nite horizon economy has a unique equilibrium, as does its limit as the time horizon S grows without a bound. As will be shown in the following section, when the stability and cohesiveness conditions both hold, a redistributive steady state results.
When the stability condition holds, the belief that future incumbents will follow redistributive policies encourages incumbents to over-accumulate …scal capacity for the purpose of redistribution. A redistributive steady state then emerges. When the cohesiveness condition holds, the belief that future incumbents will behave "responsibly" and remain at the Pigouvian steady state dissuades incumbents from accumulating excessive …scal capacity.
Multiple equilibria may exist in Battaglini and Coate (2007) for some parameter values because either type of steady state can be supported by the belief that future policy makers will follow a similar policy rule.
In a …nite-horizon economy, the period S incumbent cannot commit to anything but scrapping …scal capacity for the purpose of redistribution, if he inherits a su¢ ciently large level of …scal capacity. The period S 1 incumbent, knowing this, follows a "redistributive" policy rule, knowing that his successor will do the same. Previous incumbents follow suit. The commoninterest equilibrium is thus eliminated.
Proofs
In this section, we prove the claims of section 1.4. A redistributive steady state exists when the stability condition holds. When the stability condition does not hold but the cohesiveness condition holds, a common-interest steady state exists. A weak steady state-at the boundaries of the two regimesemerges when neither condition holds.
We
The policy functions will imply a choice of a tax rate t s .
Period S
In period S; T S ( ) = 0 trivially, as future …scal capacity has no value. There thus exists a value~ S , such that 8 S ~ S , g =ĝ. In addition, as in section 1.2, there is a value S below which t S = S and above which t S = t ( S ) :
For any S ~ S , we are in the common interest regime, and all tax revenues are used as public goods. g S = G S ( S ) which solves
Characterizing~ S The threshold for redistribution depends on whether S is greater than or smaller than S : If~ S > S then …scal capacity is not a constraint to taxation when in the redistributive regime and t S =t 8 S ~ S .
Otherwise,~ S < S =t and …scal capacity constrains taxation to t S =~ S .
S < S if and only if
which is a condition on parameter values alone.
Period S value functions Given the period S policy functions outlined above, we can characterize Z I;S ( S ) : This can be done concisely by noting that
where ( s ) = 2 when s >~ s and
We thus have a strictly concave value function wherever S < S ; wherever …scal capacity is the binding constraint on taxation.
Choice of S in period S-1 Now consider the choice of S in period S 1: This choice is governed by (6). We …rst point out that a choice S > max f S ;~ S g cannot be optimal, as (6) would then state
We now provide a condition for a choice S >~ S ; i.e. in the redistributive regime. It is summarized in the following lemma.
Lemma 1 If the incumbent in period S 1 is in the redistributive regime, he will choose to put the economy in the redistributive regime in period S if and only if
where R = min ^ ;t , with^ de…ned as in (11). Proof. Throughout the proof of this lemma, we will consider the case where the period S 1 incumbent is in the redistributive regime, so that cV g (g S 1 ) = 2 (1 ) c: To prove this lemma, we return to the two cases discussed in section 1.6.1. First, assume that (13) does not hold so that S > S : Then S >~ S implies S > max f S ;~ S g, and a choice of S in the redistributive regime cannot be optimal. (13) is therefore a necessary condition for the period S 1 incumbent to choose S >~ S : If, on the other hand, (13) is satis…ed and~ S <t; then the unique choice of S -if chosen in the redistributive regime-is S = R ; according to (6) and (14). An additional necessary condition for S to be in the redistributive regime is that R is in the redistributive regime. R >~ S is equivalent to (15) Together (13) and (15) are necessary and su¢ cient conditions for redistribution in period S, but as (13) holds only if (15) does, we are left with the condition (15) as a necessary and su¢ cient condition, as claimed.
The discussion of the terminal period and the choice of …scal capacity available in the terminal period did not depend on whether the stability and cohesiveness conditions held. We now discuss separately the case where the stability condition holds and where it does not hold.
Redistributive Steady State
We now consider parameters where the stability condition holds and show that a redistributive steady state exists. If the stability condition holds, (15) must hold as well. According to Lemma 1, if the period S 1 incumbent is in the redistributive regime, he will chose S = R . There then exists a value S 1 =~ above which fg S ; S g = ĝ; R will be chosen.
Characterizing~ ~ is the lowest value of S 1 ; for which R ;ĝ are feasible. If~ >t; then~
If~ <t then~ solves
<t if and only if
Choice of S 1 We can now characterize the period S 1 continuation value in the redistributive regime:
(16) The choice of S 1 is governed by (6). As with S ; a choice S 1 > max ~ ;t cannot be optimal, as then (6) would require 2 (1 ) c = 2 c (1 d). We can therefore show that Lemma 2 If the incumbent in period S 2 is in the redistributive regime, he will choose to put the economy in the redistributive regime in period S 1 if and only if the stability condition holds.
Proof. The proof of this lemma is almost identical to that of Lemma 2. If S 1 is chosen in the redistributive regime, S 1 = R according to (6) and (16).
R is in fact in the redistributive regime ( R >~ ) if and only if the stability condition holds.
Redistributive steady state The analysis for period S 2 holds identically for periods s < S 2: If the economy is in the redistributive regime in period s; it will remain in the redistributive regime in period s + 1 if and only if the stability condition holds. In addition s+1 = R is the chosen level of …scal capacity in the redistributive regime. Thus as S ! 1 this economy has a steady state at = R if and only if the stability condition holds. To summarize Proposition 3 A redistributive steady state at = R exists if and only if the stability condition holds.
When the stability condition does not hold
Having seen that the stability condition is a necessary and su¢ cient for the existence of a redistributive steady state at = R ; we now consider parameter values such that the stability condition fails to hold.
As indicated in Lemma 2, the stability condition determines whether the economy will be in the redistributive regime, in any period other than S: The weaker condition (15) determines whether the economy will arrive at period S with su¢ cient …scal capacity to be in the redistributive regime. Analysis is simpli…ed by assuming that not only the stability condition, but also (15), fails to hold. We show that as S ! 1; the economy is identical to that of the Pigouvian planner for all <~ : Following this analysis, we will relax this assumption and show that even if (15) holds, so that redistribution may occur in period S, the limiting economy as S ! 1 is nevertheless the same.
Lemma 1 implies that if (15) does not hold, the economy will not be in the redistributive regime in period S. Similarly, if the stability condition fails to hold, the economy will not be in the redistributive regime along the equilibrium path for any period s > 0; according to Lemma 2. Therefore, for any s > 0; the continuation values of the incumbent and opposition are the same and U I;s ( s ) = U O;s ( s ) = Z I;s ( s ) : As S ! 1 this economy becomes identical to that of the Pigouvian planner analyzed in Section 1.3 for all <~ :
We then have two cases, depending on whether~ is greater than or smaller than the candidate steady state P : If~ > P ; the Pigouvian steady state is attainable along the equilibrium path and is the unique steady state. The condition~ > P is given by the cohesiveness condition, so that we may conclude:
Proposition 4 If the stability condition does not hold, but the cohesiveness condition holds, the unique steady state C is in the common interest regime and is at C = P .
If the cohesiveness condition does not hold,~ < P ; and a steady state in the common interest regime does not exist. A steady state cannot exist in the redistributive regime either, as the stability condition does not hold. The remaining candidate for a steady state is at =~ :
If~ is a steady state, (5) must hold at~ . For <~ ; the economy is in the common interest regime, where the problem is identical to that of the Pigouvian planner. We thus have
where P < ; as shown in section 1.3, ensures that~ < : The last inequality follows from the fact that the cohesiveness condition fails to hold.
If the economy were to temporarily enter the redistributive regime, it would return to the common-interest regime in the following period, as the stability condition does not hold. Therefore
where the last inequality holds whenever the stability condition is not satis…ed. The conditions for a steady state at =~ are therefore satis…ed. We summarize the result in the following proposition.
Proposition 5 If neither the stability nor the cohesiveness condition holds, the unique steady state W is at the boundary between the common-interest and redistributive regimes:
W =~ .
As noted above, this discussion assumed that (15) did not hold. We now show that relaxing this assumption does not alter any of the conclusions above. If (15) holds in an economy of horizon S then 8 S 1 >~ S 1 , S is chosen as S = R ; as per Lemma 1. There exist values of S 1 , for which S will be chosen in the redistributive regime. Lemma 2, however, still holds and the redistributive regime will not be reached along the equilibrium path for any s 2 (0; S) : But, the possibility of redistribution in period S nevertheless implies that the value of being in opposition is di¤erent than the value of being the incumbent in period S:
For those values of S 1 such that S >~ S is chosen, the value of being the incumbent and in opposition are di¤erent, due to the di¤erential probability of being in power in period S: By induction, a similar logic can be applied to any s < S:
However, as S ! 1 the di¤erential reward for being the incumbent and in opposition moves arbitrarily far into the future. Due to discounting, the di¤erence between U I ( ) and U O ( ) accordingly approaches zero. With
; the analysis that led to propositions 4 and 5 holds even when (15) holds.
Other Equilibrium Concepts

Other Markov Equilibria
We have thus far restricted attention to equilibria emerging from limits of …nite horizon economies as the time horizon goes to in…nity. This ensured uniqueness of our MPE. This section discusses a di¤erent Markov Perfect Equilibria concept wherein functions are assumed to be concave. Unlike Battaglini and Coate (2007, 2008) we cannot assume that the value function are strictly concave. Due to the quasilinearity of the objective function, the value function is linear in …scal capacity in the redistributive regime, leading to a weakly, rather than strictly concave value function. As Battaglini, Palfrey and Nunnari (2012) point out, a large number of equilibria may emerge when the value function is assumed to be weakly concave.
In an earlier version of the paper we solved the model under the assumption of weakly concave value functions and obtained similar results to those in our benchmark model. When the cohesiveness condition holds, the unique concave equilibrium is identical limiting equilibrium in the current version. The economy's unique steady state is at the Pigouvian planner's steady state. Similarly, when neither the cohesiveness nor the stability conditions hold, the unique steady state is on the boundary between the common-interest and redistributive regimes: the weak state.
When the stability condition holds, however, a multiplicity of equilibria may exist and steady states other than R = may emerge. To illustrate this point, we now construct an additional concave equilibrium that could arise when the stability condition holds.
Consider …rst the decision rule T ( ) when >~ . One equilibrium is as in our benchmark model, where T ( ) = 8 >~ : At this candidate steady state
and the …rst order condition for …scal capacity accumulation is satis…ed by the stability condition. Another possibility following from the weak concavity of the continuation value, is that T ( ) gives values within a convex set 2 , where all values 2 are themselves within the redistributive regime. For values >~ ;
with J 2 fI; Og : Using the envelope theorem and the …rst order condition with respect to 0 ; we can then obtain
if T ( ) is di¤erentiable. In the redistributive regime, the …rst order condition with respect to 0 gives
A candidate policy function T ( ) would then have
is constant, giving a linear function T ( ). If > 1, no function T ( ) is consistent with equilibrium. However if < 1 a policy function T ( ) as in Figure 3 is consistent with equilibrium.
For all >~ ; the policy function T ( ) maps to itself and optimality is satis…ed by the argument above. 8 <~ ; the economy is expected to remain in the common interest regime inde…nitely. As the cohesiveness condition does not hold, the Pigouvian steady state cannot be supported, and T ( ) converges to~ :
For all <~
so that T (~ ) =~ is optimal as well. Optimality conditions are satis…ed for all values of and we have con…rmed that this is an equilibrium. The economy has a unique and stable steady state at =~ : This equilibrium is qualitatively di¤erent from the redistributive equilibrium that emerges as the limit to a …nite horizon economy and bears greater similarity to the weak steady state in the benchmark model.
Non-Markov Equilibria
We have focused on Markov Perfect Equilibria (MPE) in our benchmark model. In this section, we consider a di¤erent re…nement on subgame perfection that allows history dependence. We outline a model with self-enforcing In our benchmark model, cooperation is enforced by institutional factors embodied in the parameter : In contrast, this appendix studies how cooperation might be endogenously enforced through reputational mechanisms. In this formulation, we allow to be endogenously chosen in each period. Clearly, in any MPE, the optimal choice is = 0: 3 We outline here some characteristics a reputational equilibrium. We leave a full analysis of this problem for future research. As we are studying e¢ cient subgame perfect equilibria (SPE), the problem can be reformulated as that of a social welfare planner who maximizes the utility of groups A and B subject to participation constraints for both groups.
A denotes the Pareto weight assigned by the social planner to group A and A s represents the share of transfers given to group A in period s:
When the problem is thus formulated, incumbency no longer plays a role, except for the outside options of the two groups. (The "incumbent" is the group that is tempted to deviate from the SPE.) Using the methods introduced by Marcet and Marimon (2011) , the planning problem can be formulated recursively as
The …rst line in the maximization problem is the period utility of the social planner, re ‡ecting the weights A and 1 A it places on the utility of the two groups. r denotes total transfers. The next three lines are the participation constraints of the two groups with J for J 2 fA; Bg representing the Lagrange multipliers on these constraints.
J for J 2 fA; Bg is the shadow value of committing to a policy in period s and evolves recursively according to
The value function U ; A ; B represents the present value of the social planner having entered a period with …scal capacity of and promised utilities re ‡ecting shadow prices A and B . The identity of the incumbent is an implicit state variable as well. U J ( ) is the value group J obtains if the incumbent were to deviate from the sustainable plan, i.e. the outside option of group J. The identity of the incumbent enters the problem only here. The probability of turnover also enters this problem only implicitly through the value functions U J ( ) : We are silent at this point on the speci…c o¤-the-equilibrium path punishment and characterize features common to the class of all e¢ cient sustainable SPEs. Recall, however, that for the above problem to be a subgame perfect equilibrium, U A ( ) and U B ( ) must in themselves be the value functions for groups A and B, respectively, arising from some SPE.
The …rst order conditions of this maximization problem give
where is the Lagrange multiplier on the budget constraint. Whenever r > 0 we also have
and for interior choices of A :
Finally, an optimal choice of 0 requires
Applying the envelope theorem to U I ( ), we derive the following Euler equation:
In the redistributive regime, r > 0 and (18) to (20) combine to give V g (g) = 1: The quantity of public goods g =ĝ provided when in the redistributive regime is identical to the one that would result from the MPE when = 
when r > 0. If
when r > 0. In both cases 1 < V g (g) < 2; so thatĝ is greater than the level that would emerge in an MPE with = 0; but less than in an MPE with = : Due to cooperation between the factions, public good provision strictly exceeds the level that would arise in the redistributive regime an MPE (where = 0 and V g (ĝ) = 2).
It is easy to show that a redistributive steady state cannot arise. The model is stochastic, as the identity of the incumbent is a random variable.
Each time a group A or B is in power, their participation constraint may bind, which gives a strictly positive value of A or B and this alters the value of A or B . If the economy remains in the redistributive regime inde…nitely, the economy ‡uctuates based on these exogenous changes in power.
A redistributive steady state would require A = B = 0; due to (17) and = 1 + A + B in every period from (18). (21) then becomes
A constant "tightness" of participation constraints would require a decummulation of …scal capacity over time, which would bring the economy to the common interest regime. The only possibility for a redistributive economy in the long run is one where the values of A and B ‡uctuate over time. If an ergodic distribution in the redistributive regime exists, it implies cycles between periods when V g (g) = 1, with the share of transfers to each group ‡uctuating in each period-to ensure their participation-on one hand, and periods where public goods are provided below the …rst best level, but above what would emerge in an MPE.
The latter occurs if one group remains in power for a large number of periods. Maintaining that group's participation then requires not only that all transfers go to the incumbent, but also that public good provision is eroded to provide a greater amount of total transfers, as implied by (22) and (23).
A common-interest steady state, in contrast, may exist. If it exists, it is at the Pigouvian level of public good provision. In steady state A = B = 0 and (21) becomes
giving g = g P : the Pigouvian steady state is attained. In any period that the participation constraint is binding in the commoninterest regime, the dynamic system in (21) implies a declining path of public good provision and ultimately underprovision of public goods relative to the …rst best.
The unique sustainable steady state is at the …rst best: the Pigouvian steady state. Fiscal capacity, public good provision and transfers all ‡uctuate over time if the Pigouvian steady state is not sustainable. Whether the Pigouvian steady state is attainable depends on the punishment SPE implied by U A ( ) and U B ( ) : We conclude that history-dependent equilibria may be qualitatively different from the Markov Perfect Equilibrium. First, a Pigouvian steady state can potentially be supported even if there are no exogenous institutional constraints on redistribution. Second, redistributive and weak steady states do not exist, although ergodic distributions within these regimes do potentially exist. But the three types of state emerging from our benchmark model do appear arise along equilibrium paths of the sustainable equilibrium: a common-interest state, a redistributive state, and a weak state with underprovision of public goods. We leave to future research a full characterization of sustainable equilibria in this model.
